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1. KEY POINTS  
This paper examines the innovativeness of nascent and young entrepreneurial firms 
in Australia. Findings of interest in this paper include:  
• The vast majority of new ventures offer some degree of innovation in some 
aspect of their business, be it the product, the process, their market selection or 
their marketing approach. 
• With close to 75 per cent claiming they do more than taking mere imitations to 
the market, novelty in the product/service is the type of innovation most 
commonly offered by start-up firms.  
• The innovativeness of start-ups varies by industry. Construction start-ups stand 
out as particularly low in innovation across all indicators, while Manufacturing 
stands out the most in the positive direction 
• Team start-ups other than spouse teams have higher novelty, as do ventures 
started by founders with prior start-up experience. 
• There is no association between the founders’ level of education and the novelty 
of the ventures they (try to) create. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we will provide empirical evidence on the innovativeness of 
Australian start-ups, using data from the Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial 
Emergence (CAUSEE). This longitudinal data set, which was collected in four annual waves 
2007-11, uniquely allows the analysis of entrants at two stages of development. These are 
represented by random samples of Nascent firms (625 cases) – which are in the process of 
being created but not yet established in the market place – and Young firms (559 cases) – 
which have been operational for up to four years. Unless otherwise stated, any group 
differences within the CAUSEE data that we comment on are “statistically significant” at the 
most conventional risk level applied in academic studies, i.e., there is less than 5 per cent 
risk that a difference of the observed magnitude (or larger) would appear in samples drawn 
from a population where no such difference exists. The data set is further explained in the 
Appendix. For more comprehensive accounts of the CAUSEE data, please refer to Davidsson, 
Steffens, and Gordon (2011) and/or the CAUSEE User Manual (Australian Centre of 
Entrepreneurship Research, 2012). Before reporting results we give a brief background on 
prior, international research in this area.   
3. PRIOR RESEARCH ON INNOVATION IN SMALL AND NEW FIRMS 
Nobel Prize Laureate Kenneth Arrow (1983) speculated that as long as 
development costs are not prohibitive, small firms will be more innovative than large firms. 
Research focusing on formal R&D expenditure (which is an input measure) or patent 
registrations (which are relevant only for a small proportion of innovative activity) has 
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largely failed to support this claim. Other research reporting higher innovative activity for 
large firms neglect to relate the magnitude of innovative activity to the resources invested, 
making the result that “large firms innovate more” trivial. Using data that directly measured 
innovative output and relating numbers of innovations to employment size, Acs and 
Audretsch (1988) arrived at results largely in line with Arrow’s ideas: small firms are more 
innovative in many industries; notably in the most innovative ones. In other industries – 
capital-intensive ones in particular – their results suggest large firms have better innovative 
performance. 
Small firms are often young firms, and young firms are almost always small firms. 
This may make it difficult to disentangle effects of size and age, respectively (Hansen, 1992). 
As is the case with research on job creation, innovation studies have more recently leaned 
towards age rather than size as being the more important factor. In particular, it has been 
suggested that new firms are particularly likely to introduce innovations as they enter the 
market, and old firms are likely to show little innovation just before they exit (Huergo & 
Jaumandreu, 2004) while in-between there may be little relationship between firm age and 
innovation. Thus, new entrants are particularly interesting to analyse from an innovation 
point of view. 
This does not mean that all new firms are innovative. Far from it – most new firms 
and imitative firms entering mature industries tend not to be (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011; 
Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009). But this goes for firms of all sizes and ages – most of them 
are not very innovative. The point is that new firms are likely to be more innovative than 
average, in relation to size or the resources invested.  
If they manage to establish themselves in the market, more innovative firms are 
likely to have better chances to perform well. But being innovative also comes at a cost. All 
firms face “liabilities of newness” (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983) and lack of legitimacy 
(Delmar & Shane, 2004). For example, suppliers and customers may not trust a new actor in 
the marketplace the same way they trust a long term partner. If the new firm is also novel – 
innovative – this liability is aggravated (Amason, Shrader, & Tompson, 2006). In line with 
this notion, the first doctoral thesis based on CAUSEE data (see below) found that more 
innovative start-up efforts were less likely to become up and running businesses, and less 
likely to attain positive cash-flow, than were their less innovative counterparts (Semasinghe, 
2011). Once, established, the innovators may, of course, perform better. This is what 
Audretsch’ (1995) industry-level results suggest. According to his study, entrants in 
innovative industries have lower probability of survival early on. However, if they manage to 
establish themselves in the market they enjoy not only higher growth rates but also higher 
survival rates a few years later.       
As regards types of innovation and developments over time it is widely accepted 
that as industries evolve there is an early emphasis on product innovation – trying to find 
the right “form” of the basic offering – which later shifts to process innovation as the 
industry matures. This reflects that over time the competitive game becomes more focused 
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on lowering production costs for comparatively similar products or services (Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975; Utterback & Suárez, 1993). However, this does not necessarily hold at the 
firm level. As most new firms enter mature industries, one could suspect that process 
innovation would provide their ticket to a place in the market.  
A caveat with prior research is that almost all the above research has studied 
manufacturing firms exclusively. Much less is known about innovative activity in service 
industries, although there are examples. For example, Cliff, Jennings, and Greenwood (2006) 
investigated entrants into the population of law firms, asking whether it is industry 
outsiders or insiders who create the more innovative start-ups. Focusing on organisational 
innovation the answer they obtained was “neither” – rather than either of the mentioned 
extremes, it was founders with experience from the periphery of the industry (rather than 
its core, or those lacking industry experience) who displayed the highest level of innovation.  
Prior research has shown that new firms often undergo significant changes during 
their creation process and early life. As a result, the venture idea or business model they 
eventually achieve success with may be quite different from what they had in mind when 
they first entered the process (cf. Dimov, 2007; Furr, 2009). Therefore, apart from types and 
levels of innovation, our analyses will also illustrate the types, extent, and reasons for 
change that new firms go through.   
4. INNOVATION 
4.1 Level and type of innovation  
A series of nested questions were asked in order to determine the type and level of 
novelty represented by each start-up in our sample. We asked about four types of novelty, 
with slightly different wording depending on whether the firm was (or intended to be) 
mainly product-based or service-based. The four types of novelty investigated concern: 
1. the product or service offered;  
2. the method for producing or sourcing the product/service;  
3. the approach to promoting and selling the product/service, and  
4. novelty in terms of the selection of customers or markets to target.  
We first asked whether the firm offered something “entirely new” to its industry in 
each respect (yes = score 2). If the answer was yes we asked whether the offering was also 
“new to the world” (yes = score 3). Alternatively, if the answer to the first question was a 
“no” we instead asked whether the offering represented a substantial improvement over 
what other firms offer (yes = score 1). Where there was no affirmation of either question 
the firm was deemed imitative for the type of innovation in question (score = 0). Thus for 
each type of innovation, the degree of novelty was rated on a scale from zero to three. The 
response alternatives were slightly different for the “Market novelty” category while the 
question structure and response range remained the same (see legend of Figure 1d).   
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Figure 1 reports the results across all start-ups in our sample at the time of the first 
interview (1184 cases, both ‘Nascent and Young Firms). These results make clear that the 
founders are most likely to claim some degree of novelty in the product or service they 
offer. Almost 75 per cent of the respondents report some degree of product/service 
novelty, with “substantial improvement” – the lowest measured degree of novelty apart 
from sheer imitation – being the modal answer. Close to 10 per cent rate their product or 
service as “new to the world” which – as we shall see – is likely to be an exaggeration. Even 
if the average level of novelty claimed may be somewhat inflated, the differences across 
types of novelty can be trusted. It is notable that the lowest level of novelty is reported for 
method of producing or sourcing the product or service. This essentially represents “process 
innovation.” As noted above, most firms enter mature industries. One could therefore 
expect process innovation to be a prevalent way of gaining a competitive edge in the 
market. This is not the case – close to three-quarters of the start-ups claim no novelty at all 
in terms of method of producing/sourcing. This pattern is very similar for novelty in the 
approach to promoting or selling the product/service, although slightly more cases claim 
some degree of novelty in the latter respect.  
For the last type of innovation – novelty in the selection of customers or target 
markets – the reported levels of novelty are higher although not as high as for 
product/service innovation. However, since the wording of the response alternatives was 
slightly different for the last category, direct comparisons should be made with caution. 
Although the modal response is “no novelty” a majority of cases claim some degree of 
novelty, with over 40 per cent agreeing that they “focus on customers or target markets 
that other businesses have totally neglected” while much fewer claim they “focus on serving 
customers or target markets that NO other businesses focus on” which is required for the 
highest score.  
Adding the scores for the four types of novelty yields a “total novelty” score for 
each venture. This scale ranges from zero to twelve. On average Nascent Firms (mean 
novelty 3.9) view themselves as possessing a higher degree of novelty compared with Young 
Firms (mean novelty 2.4) Assessing total novelty in this way, 15 per cent of the new 
ventures claim no novelty at all, while a score of 3 is the modal response. The frequencies 
are similar for scores 0-4 (varying between 12.8 and 17.2 per cent) and then gradually 
decrease with increasing degrees of novelty. Three cases (0.3%) claim a “perfect score” of 
twelve, meaning they view themselves as “new to the world” in every respect. If this 
assessment were true, it would probably not be to these firms’ advantage. While offering a 
high degree of novelty on one or two dimensions may make for success, a company which 
tries to be innovative in every way is likely to run into severe obstacles both in terms of 
ability to reliably deliver their product or service, and in terms of market acceptance. 
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Figure 1. 
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The type and – especially – the level of novelty offered vary by industry. In Figure 2, 
this is exemplified by the degree of product/service novelty. The Retail, Consumer Services, 
Health and Social Services, Manufacturing, Construction, Agriculture, and Business 
Consultancy each represent more than 5 per cent of all start-ups (> 60 cases in the sample). 
Because only these have sufficient representation to reliably represent their underlying 
population we restrict our commentary to these industries.  
Figure 2. 
 
Of the well-represented industries, Manufacturing, Health/Education/Social 
Services, Retailing, and Consumer Services stand out as more innovative. The Construction 
and Agriculture industries score low; to a lesser extent this is also true for Business 
Consultancy. With an average of 1.44 versus 0.82, the contrast between Manufacturing and 
Construction is noteworthy. Arguably, establishing a  manufacturing firm in Australia in the 
current economic climate requires a certain level of innovation to be meaningful or viable.  
Somewhat surprisingly, there are no major differences in what industries score high 
or low across different types of innovation. Thus, there is no clear tendency for, for 
example, product innovation to dominate in one industry, while market innovation 
dominates in another. Instead, the results in Figure 2 well represent the general pattern – 
those scoring high or low tend to do so across the board, although Business Consultancy 
comes out slightly better in terms of Market novelty. The low overall score for Agriculture 
may be regarded surprising, e.g., in the light of the alleged innovativeness of Australian wine 
makers (Aylward & Turpin, 2003). However, these represent but a niche within agriculture, 
and even within that niche a few actors – rather than the average start-up – may be 
responsible for most of the innovations 
4.2 Innovation by subgroups  
Figure 3 reports data on the level of innovation for different sub-groups within our 
total sample. These data reflect the situation at Wave 1, i.e., the first round of interviewing. 
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We will turn to developments over time in the next section. The results are reported 
through “boxplots”1. This type of diagram gives a better representation of group differences 
than do simple comparisons of means. While the latter may erroneously give the impression 
that “all the members of category X are like this, while all the members of category Y are 
like that” the boxplot displays both the central tendency and the dispersion within groups, 
thus highlighting the high degree of overlap across groups that may be present even when 
there is a “statistically significant” mean difference. The plot also reveals any (differential) 
skewness in the distributions, as it partitions these into four parts where each part 
represents 25 per cent of the cases. The shaded area in the boxplot shows where the middle 
50 per cent of the sub-sample are found. This middle group is divided into two equal parts 
by the median, depicted by the line in the shaded area. The bottom 25 per cent have values 
between the bottom of the shaded area and the lower crossbar. Similarly, the vertical line 
from the shaded area to the top crossbar shows the range of values for the top 25 per cent 
of the cases. However, the maximum (minimum) level for the top (bottom) crossbar is set at 
a value corresponding to adding 1.5 times the height of the shaded box on top (at the 
bottom) of that box. This means that occasionally a few extreme cases are excluded from 
the graphical representation.  
Figure 3a compares the total level of novelty for ventures founded by males, 
females, and mixed-gender teams. The “Male” and “Female” categories here include both 
male (female) solo-founders and start-up teams where all members are male (female). 
There is a slight tendency for Male start-ups to score higher on innovation. However, this 
difference is weak and statistically uncertain. As can be seen, it is only in the location of the 
middle 50 per cent that there is any visible difference at all in the sample – the median as 
well as the lowest and highest scores in the diagram are all the same for Male and Female 
ventures. There is no tendency for the mixed-gender category to deviate from either of the 
comparison groups. In all, there seem to be very little relationship between gender and level 
of innovation. 
                                                     
1 The results are reported through “boxplots”. This type of diagram gives a better representation of group differences than do simple 
comparisons of means. While the latter may erroneously give the impression that “all the members of category X are like this, while all the 
members of category Y are like that” the boxplot displays both the central tendency and the dispersion within groups, thus highlighting 
the high degree of overlap across groups that may be present even when there is a “statistically significant” mean difference. The plot also 
reveals any (differential) skewness in the distributions, as it partitions these into four parts where each part represents 25 per cent of the 
cases. The shaded area in the boxplot shows where the middle 50 per cent of the sub-sample are found. This middle group is divided into 
two equal parts by the median, depicted by the line in the shaded area. The bottom 25 per cent have values between the bottom of the 
shaded area and the lower crossbar. Similarly, the vertical line from the shaded area to the top crossbar shows the range of values for the 
top 25 per cent of the cases. However, the maximum (minimum) level for the top (bottom) crossbar is set at a value corresponding to 
adding 1.5 times the height of the shaded box on top (at the bottom) of that box. This means that occasionally a few extreme cases are 
excluded from the graphical representation. 
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Figure 3.  
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The second panel Figure 3b instead contrasts solo founders with different types of 
teams. As can be seen, solo founders and spouse teams have identical results, and both 
categories represent low levels of innovation. Other types of teams start more innovative 
ventures. Surprisingly, however, it is not the Professional teams – those who have joined 
together for the purpose of this start-up rather than being based on pre-existing family or 
friendship relations – that score the highest. Instead, this category only scores marginally 
higher than average, and it is instead the “Personal” teams that display the highest level of 
innovation 
Figure 3c compares novice founders with those who have prior start-up experience. 
Here there is a clear – albeit not huge – difference: those with prior start-up experience on 
average (try to) create more innovative start-ups. This is important to remember when 
analysing outcomes. As noted above, while innovative ventures may have better prospects 
if they manage to get off the ground, they may also be more difficult – and take longer – to 
get established in the market in the first place. Therefore, if those with more prior 
experience (and other forms of “human capital”) go for more ambitious ventures, they may 
spuriously appear less successful in a short- to medium term analysis of outcomes. 
Finally, Figure 3d compares start-ups with and without university-educated 
founders. Here, the results – perhaps somewhat surprisingly – suggest there is no 
difference. Founders with university background do not on average create more innovative 
new ventures than do founders without such education.   
4.3 Changes in reported innovativeness over time 
The questions about each type of novelty were repeated in interview waves 2 and 
3, conducted at 12 and 24 months, respectively, after the initial interview (in the shortened 
Wave 4 interview, this section was omitted). This allows the analysis of changes over time. 
Such analyses can be undertaken in two different ways. The first version uses all available 
cases in each wave. Alternatively, the analysis only includes those cases which have been 
interviewed in all (three) waves. The first type of analysis is the better representation of the 
entire population of start-ups at particular stages of development, and also has the 
advantage of an increased sample size for more powerful statistical testing. However, the 
second type of analysis better captures how a given group of start-ups change their 
behaviour or perceptions over time. Below we report the former type of analysis; however, 
the results are almost identical when only cases that continue their participation are 
included.  
In addition to repeating the questions in each wave, the computer-aided interview 
software instantly calculated the difference in scores between waves, and when there was a 
difference the respondent was asked about the reason for the difference. The respondents 
were given the option to report that the difference was due to:  
1. them having realised that their venture was more (less) novel than they initially 
realised or  
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2. them having undertaken some change which made the venture more (less) 
novel than previously reported.  
Figure 4 shows the results, i.e., how the reported level of novelty develops over 
time, for three key subgroups of our data. These are Nascent versus Young firms; founders 
with and without prior start-up experience, and founders with and without university 
education. The contrast between Nascent and Young firms reveal three important patterns.  
• First, the Nascent firms consistently report higher levels of novelty than do the 
Young firms.  
• Second, the assessed level of novelty decreases over time.  
• Third, the gap in estimated novelty decreases over time, although this trend is 
not particularly strong.  
Figure 4.  
 
 
 
We interpret this as follows, Nascent firms could be more novel than Young firms 
because consecutive “generations” (cohorts) of Australian start-ups become ever more 
innovative. While this is a possibility, we would not attribute any considerable part of the 
observed effect to such a trend. Nascent firms can also be more novel because a higher level 
of novelty means a lower chance to ever become an operational Young firm. This we know 
is the case (at least within a given time frame) as shown by results reported in Semasinghe 
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time suggests the initial estimates are exaggerated. This is supported by the fact that 70-80 
per cent of those reporting lower novelty over time say the reason is they previously over-
estimated the novelty of their venture. 
The steeper slope of the Nascent category (Figure 4)suggests the degree of initial 
over-estimation was larger in this group while the fact that Young firm founders also adjust 
their estimate downward to some degree suggests it often takes considerable time to arrive 
at full realism in this assessment. Importantly, there is still a marked difference in estimated 
novelty at W3. We suggest this is due to a combination of the remainder reflecting greater 
exaggeration of the true novelty in the Nascent group, and the existence of a larger share of 
truly more novel ventures among them – which will have below-average chances of 
becoming operational firms.  
Figure 3 revealed a clear, albeit not very large, difference between experienced and 
novice founders, such that the former create more innovative ventures. As experienced 
founders should be better at assessing the true level of novelty of their ventures we 
suspected that the true difference between these groups could actually be larger than what 
the initial analysis – based on Wave 1 data only – suggested. However, the second panel in 
Figure 4 shows that this is not the case. Instead the difference between experienced and 
novice founders is stable over time. This increases the confidence in interpreting the 
difference as real, but the analysis lends no support to the notion that experienced founders 
better assess the true standing of their venture (in terms of innovation) at early stages of 
development. 
Similarly, the analysis in Figure 3 suggested there was no difference in level of 
novelty between ventures with and without university-educated founders. Here, one could 
suspect that founders with higher education are more accurate in their assessment, making 
other founders’ inflated estimates obscure a true relationship between education and 
innovation. However, Figure 4c gives no support to this notion. Founders with university 
degrees adjust their reported level of novelty downward just as much over time as do other 
founders. As a consequence, the results for ventures with and without university-educated 
founders are close to identical to each other in each wave, while both categories show a 
downward trend over time.  Again, this is due much more to the realisation that earlier 
estimates were inflated than to any real changes of the venture. 
4.4 Other innovation indicators 
In addition to the questions underlying the novelty scales used above the CAUSEE 
interviews include a number of other indicators of innovative input and –output among 
Australian start-ups. One question asks whether the founders consider the venture “high 
tech” or not. Importantly, this does not necessarily refer to what they sell but can also be 
based on the technology they use to produce or distribute it. The same goes for a question 
regarding whether “technologies or procedures required for your main product generally 
available more than five years ago.” A third indicator asks – binary with response 
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alternatives “yes” or “no” like the previous two – whether “spending on research and 
development [is/will be] a major priority for this business.” In addition, questions about 
whether and an array of possible “gestation activities” were undertaken include inquiry into 
whether proprietary technology for the venture was developed, and whether any 
applications for intellectual property (IP) protection were lodged. 
Figure 5 reports the proportion of the sample responding affirmatively to each of 
these innovation indicators. It turns out that a substantial share of the sample – 20 per cent 
or more – report their venture as being “high tech” and/or based on new technologies 
and/or giving R&D a central role. The reported proportions are markedly higher for Nascent 
firms. We assume this is for reasons similar to what was discussed above. The figure for R&D 
focus is particularly high among the Nascent firms, and considerably higher than for a 
comparative sample in the US (Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon, & Reynolds, 2008). For the last 
two innovation indicators – proprietary technology, and IP applications the absolute levels 
are lower (around 10 per cent) and there is no tendency for Nascent firms to score higher 
than the Young firms. Presumably, this is because these latter indicators can acccumulate 
over time. Thus, the expectation should rather be that Young firms report higher levels. It is 
important to note that “IP application” does not equal “patent” – which is a rare occurrence 
– but includes also weaker forms such as trademarks and copyright.  
Figure 5. 
 
There are some important differences across industries in the prevalence of these 
innovation indicators. These are reported in Table 1, which only includes industries 
representing more than 5 per cent of all start-ups in the sample. A single plus (minus) 
represents a non-negligible but somewhat weak or statistically uncertain over (under) 
representation (compared to the average across all industries), a double plus (minus) 
denotes a larger and more certain difference, while those left blank do not show statistically 
significant relationships. 
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The most remarkable result in Table 1 is the consistently low incidence of 
innovative activity demonstrated by new firms in the Construction industry. For every 
innovation indicator (like with assessed novelty above) this industry scores significantly 
lower than average. This reinforces the impression from our earlier analysis of reported 
novelty, where Construction had the lowest overall score among major industries and also 
scored among the lowest for each type of novelty. 
Manufacturing again stands out as the most innovative sector – possibly forced to 
do so under current conditions – while Consumer Services does not stand out from the 
average on any dimension. The most varied pattern across industries appears for (self-) 
rating as “high tech” where Business Consultancy scores higher than average while Retailing 
and Health/Education/Social services join Construction with a low score.  
Table 1. Innovation Indicators by Major Industries 
 High 
technology 
New 
technology 
R& D 
Focus 
Proprietary 
technology 
IP 
Protection 
Retailing --     
Consumer Services      
Health/Education/Social Services --     
Manufacturing   + ++ ++ 
Construction -- -- -- -- -- 
Agriculture   -   
Business Consultancy ++   +  
 
Is innovation a product of internal resource advantages, or are they a generator of 
such advantages? The CAUSEE data suggest there is some, but not particularly strong, 
relationships between resource advantages and indicators of innovation. In each wave the 
respondents were asked a package of questions to assess their perceived resource 
advantages (or disadvantages), broadly defined this corresponded to resource advantage 
along a number of dimensions. The empirically derived dimensions of advantages concern 
Marketing expertise; Technical Expertise; Cost structure; Organizational flexibility; 
Knowledge of trends (essentially environmental awareness); Networks, and Product/Service 
uniqueness. Figure 6 exemplifies the relationship between innovation and resource 
advantages by comparing the latter for firms having and not having IP protection at Wave 1. 
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Figure 6. 
 
As can be seen, the average ratings of advantages do not look radically different 
between the two groups. Statistically, some advantages seem more pronounced among 
those with IP protection, namely the presence of Marketing expertise and – not surprisingly 
– Uniqueness of the product/service. The IP group also seems marginally stronger in terms 
of Technical expertise and Knowledge of trends. At Wave 3 (24 months later) the pattern of 
differences is similar, but due to the smaller number of cases it is only in terms of 
Uniqueness that the difference is sufficiently strong to be regarded statistically significant, 
and unlikely to be due to random chance. 
Finally, Figure 7 displays how these indicators develop over time for Nascent and 
Young firms, respectively. Comparing the levels for these two categories the results again 
indicate lowering levels of innovation over time, at least for the more frequently affirmed 
questions about “high tech” status and “R&D Focus”. As discussed previously this is likely 
due to greater over-estimation in the Nascent group in combination with the fact that more 
innovative ventures are more difficult to get off the ground. They therefore stay nascent for 
a longer time (becoming over-represented in that group at sampling) and/or never 
‘graduate’ to becoming Young Firms.  
Figure 7. 
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Examining the patterns over time within categories the downward trend is evident 
for R&D focus but not so much for self-reporting as “high tech”. The data for Proprietary 
technology and IP protection represent additional cases reporting these events in each 
wave. Therefore, downward slopes do not indicate a diminishing total number of firms 
being engaged in these activities.   
4.5 Innovation in “high tech” start-ups  
Above we used (self-rated) high tech status as one of the innovation indicators. But 
are high technology ventures necessarily more innovative? And are different types of high 
tech firms equally innovative? Figure 8 answers these questions by displaying the overall 
novelty score over time for product- and service-oriented high tech firms as compared to 
their lower tech counterparts (with the exclusion of retailing firms). 
Figure 8. 
 
These results show that reported levels of novelty are indeed much higher in start-
ups nominated as “high tech”. They are also consistently higher among Product-oriented 
than for Service-oriented ventures. This goes both in the high tech category and for the 
comparison firms, and reflects industry patterns reported earlier in this paper. As can be 
seen, both high tech- and other firms adjust their estimated level of novelty over time. 
However, this downward trend has a much steeper slope in the high tech category. As a 
result, while the difference between high tech- and other firms is still sizeable at Wave 3, it 
is much smaller than it was in Wave 1. Presumably, this reflects a difference in the accuracy 
of the original (Wave 1) assessment more than it reflects a difference in actual adaptation of 
the true level of novelty.  
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5. VENTURE ADAPTATION AND CHANGE 
5.1 Do ventures continue innovating by adjusting their venture idea? 
As mentioned earlier, prior literature (Dimov, 2007; Furr, 2009) suggests that new 
firms often change aspects of their venture idea or business model quite considerably – and 
several times – before they find a mode of operating that really works. To what extent is this 
true for a random sample of Australian start-ups? And what aspects of the business are they 
most likely to change? Figure 9 reports the average number of important changes reported 
at Wave 1 as being undertaken over the past 12 months. Four areas of change are 
considered, namely the same four as those delineated in our novelty questions: the 
product/service offering; the method of promoting or selling; the way in which the 
product/service is produced or sourced, and what customers/markets are targeted.  
The following observations can be made. First, the average number of changes 
reported in each category is relatively low. This is because most firms do not report any 
changes. Across both Nascent and Young firms, 57 per cent report no changes to the 
product/service. For the other areas of change the proportion reporting no changes is 2 out 
of 3. Thus, among those who report changes the average number of changes is much higher 
than what is reported in the figure. For product/service changes almost 25 per cent of the 
sample report three or more changes while for the other categories this number of changes 
is undertaken by just above 10 per cent of all firms.  
Second, changes to the product or service are more prevalent than are changes to 
other aspects of the business. This is in line with our earlier findings about levels of novelty 
in different aspects of the business model. Third, changes to the product/service are more 
prevalent among Nascent firms, while the opposite holds true for changes to the manner of 
selling or promoting. This reflects the different stages of development the two categories of 
firm are in; Nascent firms are to a greater extent still adjusting the form of their basic 
offering(s) while Young firms, who are by definition already trading in the market on a 
regular basis, have more reason to alter their marketing approach.      
Figure 9. 
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Figure 10 completes the picture by illustrating how the number of changes 
undertaken per year changes over time. This analysis aggregates changes across the four 
areas, which is why the average numbers are higher than any reported in Figure 9. In Figure 
10a the analysis contrasts Nascent and Young firms. This analysis reveals that – as should be 
expected – the number of changes per year decreases as the ventures mature. Nascent 
firms consistently report higher numbers of changes and this difference does not close over 
time. As indicated by Figure 9 it is changes to the product/service that drive the overall 
difference in numbers of changes. 
Figure 10.  
 
Two contrasting ideas could be put forward regarding how prior entrepreneurial 
experience affects the number of changes carried out. On the one hand, one could expect 
more experienced founders to be better able to “get it right the first time” and thus in less 
need of undertaking corrective changes further down the track. On the other hand, one 
might suspect that experienced founders are either more creative/innovative in response to 
what they learn when trying to implement their initial ideas, or have a greater appreciation 
of the need to adapt in order to achieve market success. Figure 10b shows that the latter 
tendency dominates. Ventures founded by people with prior start-up experience carry out 
more changes to the business over time, and there is no tendency for this difference to 
disappear in later waves of data collection (if anything, the tendency is in the opposite 
direction). Again, this overall variation is driven by a difference in the propensity to change 
the product or service offered. 
5.2 Why is the venture idea changed? 
The question about numbers of changes was followed up by questions about what 
triggered or motivated the changes. Figure 11 summarises the results at two points in time, 
namely Wave 1 (initial interview) and Wave 3 (24 months later). The average numbers are 
low because many ventures have not undertaken any changes and because many reasons 
‘compete’ for being nominated.  
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Figure 11.  
 
 
A first observation here is that some reasons are given more frequently than 
others, notably customer successes refocused effort and internal (own) interest, and to 
some extent customer instigated requests and market research (which need not refer to 
formal or outsourced analyses). Second, consistent with the pattern in Figure 10 the 
averages are lower in Wave 3 than in Wave 1, although the relative position of the different 
reasons is generally similar. Some differences between Nascent and Young firms indicate 
trends over time or over stages of venture development. Nascent firms more frequently 
report changes induced by market research at both points in time. At Wave 1 they also 
more frequently report changes being necessitated by lack of funds. Young firms on the 
other hand more frequently report customer requests, customer successes, and (marginally) 
customer failures are triggers of change. However, none of these differences hold up at 
Wave 3 – at which point a large share of the Nascent category have become firms regularly 
operating in the market. One type of reason is higher at Wave 3 for the Young firms, and 
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this is changes induced by the influence of business partners. All of the observed differences 
are consistent with the different stages of business development these two categories of 
firm represent. Somewhat curiously, at Wave 3 Nascent firms report internal interest as 
driver more often than do Young firms, while no such difference is evident at W1.   
6. INNOVATION AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE 
CAUSEE does not include significant information on the use of government support, 
and the sample is too varied for questions about particular schemes to be meaningful. Some 
indicators were included, though. First, two different questions tap into whether the 
founders have turned to any government program/agency or Non-government 
organisations (NGOs) for assistance or advice. Second, there is information about whether 
government grants have been received as a source of funding. This latter question is not 
bundled with any non-government sources. 
It should first be made clear that only a minority of cases use the assistance 
services in question. At Wave 1 about 20-25 per cent of Young and Nascent firms use 
government or NGO services for assistance and advice, and 6-7 per cent have received 
government grants. These proportions decline in subsequent waves, which ask about use 
within the last 12-month period only and thus do not include use reported in earlier waves.  
The boxplots in Figure 12 report results where use of government (and NGO) assistance is 
related to the ventures’ overall level of novelty (as assessed in Wave 1). The graphs show a 
tendency toward those receiving government support to be more innovative on average. 
The group differences are statistically certain by conventional criteria. However, the graph 
also makes clear that the differences are not particularly large and that those receiving 
government (or NGO) advice or funding are found along the entire spectrum from imitative 
to highly innovative ventures. No causal link between novelty and government 
funding/assistance is implied by the results as such. It may be that the assistance helps the 
ventures become more innovative, but alternatively – and perhaps more likely at least in the 
case of grants – the reason for the observed association is that more innovative ventures 
are more likely to seek and – in particular – receive the support. 
Figure 12.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up this analysis of the innovativeness of Australian business start-ups, we 
note that: 
• The vast majority of new ventures offer some degree of innovation in some 
aspect of their business, be it the product, the process, their market selection or 
their marketing approach. 
• With close to 75 per cent claiming they do more than taking mere imitations to 
the market, novelty in the product/service is the type of innovation most 
commonly offered by start-up firms.  
• Novelty in the method of producing or sourcing the product/service is rarer, 
with 75 per cent claiming no distinction from what other businesses do.  
• A substantial minority of start-ups also affirm other indicators of innovation, 
such as being based on “high” or new technology; emphasising research and 
development, or (less frequently) having proprietary technology or IP 
protection. 
As regards subgroup differences in innovativeness we observe that: 
• The innovativeness of start-ups varies by industry. Construction start-ups stand 
out as particularly low in innovation across all indicators, while Manufacturing 
stands out the most in the positive direction. 
• There are no statistically significant gender differences in the overall novelty of 
the start-ups.  
• Teams start-ups other than spouse teams have higher novelty, as do ventures 
started by founders with prior start-up experience. 
• There is no association between the founders’ level of education and the novelty 
of the ventures they (try to) create.  
Analyses reflecting changes in reported innovativeness over time reveal that: 
• Nascent firms report higher novelty, which is probably in part real and in part 
due to greater over-estimation of their true innovativeness compared to that of 
Young firms. 
• Early exaggeration of the true level of novelty is indicated by all analysed 
subgroups adjusting their reported novelty downward over time. In response to 
a direct question, the majority admits the downward adjustment is due to 
earlier over-estimation rather than to real changes to the venture.  
• Downward adjustment over time also occurs for some other innovation 
indicators, notably so for emphasis on R&D. 
• The downward adjustment in estimated innovativeness is stronger among 
Nascent than among Young firms, but a difference between the categories 
remains at the end of the study period. In part, this remaining difference is likely 
to reflect that more innovative firms are more difficult to establish firmly in the 
market. 
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• Experienced and more highly educated founders seem to over-estimate the true 
level of novelty of their ventures just as much as do other business founders.  
We also analysed the start-ups’ continued innovativeness as reflected in the 
changes they undertake over time. These analyses showed that: 
• Every year, a substantial share undertakes important changes to their  venture 
idea or business model. 
• Changes to the product/service offering are the most frequent, mirroring the 
above results for degree of novelty. 
• The number of changes undertaken decreases over time. 
• The reasons for undertaking changes also change over time, with (probably 
informal) market research being important at the earlier stages and influences 
from customers and business partners coming to the fore later on in the 
process.  
Finally, we also noted that there is a positive association between the level of 
novelty of the start-up on the one hand, and its propensity to use government sources of 
funding or advice on the other.  
The overall picture that emerges is one where the population of new businesses 
provide an important injection of novelty into the economy. Adjusting the apparently 
somewhat inflated self-reports of innovative activity the start-ups appear moderately 
innovative – but one should not expect highly innovative entities set for spectacular growth 
to weigh heavily in a random sample of start-ups. In the limited international comparisons 
we have undertaken the innovativeness of Australian start-ups appears high rather than 
low. Starting from realistic expectations we would argue that the overall level of 
innovativeness represented in these start-ups is rather encouraging. However, the low level 
of innovativeness reported by Construction start-ups and the absence of any relationship 
between education and innovativeness may be valid causes for concern.  
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APPENDIX 
About CAUSEE 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) is a 
research program that aims to uncover the factors that initiate, hinder and facilitate the 
process of creation of new businesses in Australia. CAUSEE employs and extends in the 
Australian context the approach to studying ‘nascent entrepreneurs’ and ‘firms in gestation’ 
that was first developed for the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) (Gartner, 
Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004) and is partly harmonised with the PSED II study 
undertaken in the US 2005-2010 (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). The CAUSEE data collection was 
funded by the Australian Research Council with contributions also from industry partners 
BDO and National Australia Bank. More comprehensive accounts of the CAUSEE data 
collection can be found in (Davidsson et al., 2011) and in the CAUSEE user manual 
(Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, 2012). 
The major purpose of the research is to identify representative samples of on-going 
venture start-up efforts and follow their development over time. This approach addresses 
the under coverage of, and/or sparseness of data about the smallest and youngest entities 
that typically signify available business data bases. It also overcomes the selection bias 
resulting from including only start-up efforts that actually resulted in up-and-running 
businesses. Further, the approach largely overcomes hindsight bias and memory decay2 
resulting from asking survey questions about the start-up process retrospectively, and gets 
the temporal order of assessment right for cause-and-effect analysis. 
The primary data set for CAUSEE comprises of random samples of Nascent firms (N 
= 625) and Young firms (N = 559). While the main level of analysis in CAUSEE is the 
(emerging) venture or firm, sampling necessarily starts with the individuals behind the start-
ups. Thus, the samples were obtained by screening adults in 30,105 randomly sampled 
households. Qualified individuals were retained as the sole spokesperson on behalf of the 
firm whether or not it had additional owners; however questions were asked about the 
contributions of all owners.  
In order to qualify in the Nascent firm category, the respondent had to report 
concrete (and continuing) actions towards starting a new business within the past 12 
months, be a part owner of this business, and not yet having experienced a period where 
revenues exceeded costs for at least 6 of the past 12 months. In the latter case, the 
respondent was instead included in the Young firms category provided the firm had not 
been operational for more than four years. Among the non-eligible cases every 50th 
respondent was selected for inclusion in a Control Group (n=506) to allow for basic socio-
demographic comparisons between business founders and the general population. The 
Control Group was not followed over time. 
                                                     
2 Hindsight bias refers to the tendency for people to re-interpret past events based on current circumstances and this can bias 
retrospective research. Memory decay refers to the fact that events further in the past are more difficult to recall, and this effect can bias 
research which requires the recollection of the past. 
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Supplementary, non-random samples of “High Potential” Nascent firms (N = 102) 
and Young firms (N = 113) were also generated. These cases were sourced from a broad 
array of individuals and organizations likely to be in contact with such start-ups at an early 
stage. Apart from the criteria described above the High Potential ventures had to reach a 
certain minimum score across criteria based on the education and experience of the 
founders, their aspirations for the venture, and its level of technological sophistication (it 
should be noted that a distinct minority of the random samples also meet these criteria).   
Eligible cases that agreed to participate proceeded through a 40-55 minute long 
telephone interview. They were subsequently re-contacted for follow-up interviews of 
approximately the same length every 12 months over three years. Hence, the data base 
consists of four waves of interviews undertaken in 2007/8 to 2010/11. In each wave, about 
85 per cent of eligible cases agreed to participate. The fact that some start-ups cease to 
operate during the study further reduces the number of cases over time. It may be noted 
that this affects more the Nascent firm category compared to Young firms. Therefore, the 
maximum numbers of cases available for analysis in each sample category and data 
collection wave are as follows. 
Table A1. CAUSEE samples and response rates across waves 
 Random 
sample 
Nascent 
Firms 
Random 
sample 
Young Firms 
High 
Potential 
Nascent 
Firms 
High 
Potential 
Young Firms 
Non-
entrepreneur 
Control 
Group 
Wave 1 625 559 106 120 506 
Wave 2 493 472 91 98 n/a 
Wave 3 281 353 71 81 n/a 
Wave 4 183 263 59 64 n/a 
 
The design allows for two types of analyses of development over time. First, 
individual cases can be followed across the waves of data collection, i.e., for a maximum of 
three years. Second, comparisons between Nascent firms and Young firms also indicate 
development over time, extending the total window through which the study captures start-
up processes to at least 6-7 years. However, the latter type of comparison must be 
interpreted with caution as it confounds changes in the composition of different start-up 
populations (cohorts) over time at the first point of entry, and what happens over time to 
the members of a given cohort.  
In each wave of data collection a large amount of information was collected about 
the characteristics of the venture; the resources available to or invested in it; its strategies, 
actions and aspirations, and the outcomes it had achieved. When a venture had been 
terminated an ‘exit interview’ was performed and the case was dropped from subsequent 
waves. Different reports in this series will focus on different parts of these contents, and to 
some degree on different sub-samples.  
